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BOOK REVIEW
SWORD OR SHIELD: THE PAST AND FUTURE
IMPACT OF WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT
ON AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT. By Robert
A. Williams, Jr.1 Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. 352. $39.95.
2
Reviewed by Kevin J Worthen

[American Indian tribes'] rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied
by the originalfundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive
3
title to those who made it.

Chief Justice Marshall's explanation of the "Discovery Doctrine"
generally serves as the starting point for the study of federal Indian
law. It is, by contrast, the culmination of Robert Williams's book,
The American Indian in Western Legal Thought. Tracing the lineage

of the Discovery Doctrine from medieval crusades, through imperial
Spain and England, and ultimately to the United States, Williams
attempts to lay bare the moral (or4 perhaps immoral) underpinnings of
contemporary federal Indian law.

Williams relies heavily on secondary sources, not aiming to please
intellectual historians interested in the ambiguities of particular historical events (p. 7).s He instead pursues broader themes, fomenting
I Professor,

University of Arizona Law School; Member, Lumbee Indian Tribe.

2 Associate Professor, Brigham Young University School of Law. I am grateful for the

untiring research and editorial assistance of Ken Kuykendall.
3 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
4 Much of the material in the book has been published by Williams in law review articles.
See Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219; Williams, Jefferson,
the Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 ARiz. L. REv. 65 (1987); Williams, The
Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal
Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. i (1983) [hereinafter Williams, Origins of Indian Status]. The
impact of Williams's arguments are, however, much more powerfully presented as a single unit
than when read seriatim.
5
This Book Review makes no effort to verify or validate the historical accuracy of Williams's
views, though his book could profitably be examined from that standpoint. The book also
prompts one to question the extent, if any, to which the experience of indigenous peoples forced
to accept Western law has been different from that of peoples subjugated by non-Western
cultures. This Book Review, however, limits itself to the question whether Western legal thought
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passionate disgust rather than detached analysis as he exposes the
inhumane origins of the Discovery Doctrine and the grotesque uses to
which its predecessor theories were put. Reading Williams's book is
like stumbling upon a mass grave, the remnant of a brutal massacre
committed by one's own ancestors and excused by one's contemporaries. Williams ably demonstrates how Western legal dogma has
been used to cleave Native Americans from their rights to life, liberty,
and property. He postulates, though with less elaboration, that current federal Indian law merely perpetuates that legacy.
Williams's book compels one to ask whether Western legal concepts
are inevitably inimical to the survival of American Indian tribalism.
The future of federal Indian law will ultimately depend on the answer
to this critical question. 6 Williams's conclusions, though somewhat
equivocal, seem unnecessarily pessimistic. Western legal concepts, if
used creatively, can protect instead of destroy tribal sovereignty.

I. THE DIsCovERY DOCTRINE:
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT AS A SWORD

According to Williams, Western legal concepts concerning Native
Americans derive from notions developed by the medieval Church
concerning the status of non-Christians. Two themes dominated Cathcan accommodate American Indian tribes' legitimate desire to create and preserve their own
views and norms.
6 Diametrically opposed views concerning the proper future course of federal Indian law are
set forth in a lively exchange of views prompted by some of Williams's earlier work. Compare
Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An
Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 421-30 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Plenary Power] (arguing in favor of the status quo and concluding that
congressional self-restraint, coupled with judicial recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty when
Congress has not acted, adequately ensure the future of American tribes) with Williams, Learning
to Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to ProfessorLaurence's Learning to Live With the
Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 3o ARiz. L. REv. 439, 451-52, 457 (988)
[hereinafter Williams, EurocentricMyopia] (expressing pessimism about Western law, Congress,
the courts, and the Constitution, and postulating that tribes will be truly secure only when "the
lie of words sustained by Federal Indian legal law and its blind obeisance to the Discovery
Doctrine and the closely related congressional plenary power doctrines can no longer be lived
with"). Professor Laurence rebuts Williams's criticisms of Plenary Power in Laurence, On
Eurocentric Myopia, The Designated Hitter Rule and "The Actual State of Things," 30 Aniz.
L. REV. 459 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Actual State of Things].
This Book Review stakes out a middle ground between the views of Professors Williams
and Laurence. Reliance on congressional good will seems far too risky for tribes, given past
performances. Contrary to Professor Laurence's argument, some constitutional limitation on
Congress's authority to regulate tribes is desirable and probably necessary if the disparate
viewpoints of Indians are to be given a meaningful place in modem America. See infra p.
1384. At the same time, the complete restructuring of the American legal system advocated by
Professor Williams seems both undesirable and unachievable. See infra p. 1383.
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olic thought at the time: hierarchy and unity. 7 The unifying force was
Christ's redemption of all mankind upon conditions of repentance; the
apex of the hierarchy was the Pope who, through Peter, had been
given a divine mandate to shepherd the universal flock.
Williams notes that this "vision of a unitary Christian society
directed by God's vicar" (p. i8) did not go unchallenged even in
medieval times. Civil monarchs relied on early Roman legal and
political thought to resist papal hierocratic claims (pp. 41-43). In
response to such challenges, the Church changed its doctrines in subtle
ways to embrace some elements of secular humanism (such as the
concept of natural law), but retained the underlying themes of unity
and hierarchy (pp. 43-50).
For example, at the time of the Crusades, Pope Innocent IV
exploited natural law themes to legitimize the Crusaders' violent efforts to dispossess non-Christians of dominiumg over their lands. Acknowledging that infidels had natural law rights to property and selfgovernance, the Pope nevertheless justified the violation of those
rights. Non-Christians exhibited their need for instruction and protection by engaging in conduct deemed unacceptable by the ultimate
interpreter of natural law, the Pope (pp. 46-47).
Innocent IV thus recognized the need to call on reason to justify
the aggression of the Crusaders (a need created by secular humanism's
challenge to Church authority), but retained for himself and his successors the prerogative to determine the content of that reason. He
also effectively set the pattern for future legal justifications for the
deprivation by Europeans of the human rights of what Williams terms
"normatively divergent" societies: "as rational beings, infidels, like
Christians, were responsible for their conduct under natural law, and
excessive breaches of the universalized dictates and norms of this
Eurocentric legal discourse indicated a lack of reason requiring remediation" (p. 49). The very fact that infidels failed to conform their
conduct and beliefs to Western European norms indicated a lack of
ability to exercise properly their natural rights. It was therefore necessary for more enlightened guardians to assume authority over them
until they could be "civilized." 9
7 Williams traces medieval Church dogma back to the writings of Paul concerning the corpus
mysticum Christi (the Church as the mystical body of Christ), in which everyone belongs to the
community of Christ's body (the theme of unity), and every limb of the body is assigned an
ordered place (the theme of hierarchy) (p. 1S). See, e.g., i Corinthians 12:12-29.
8 The power of dominium included the authority both to possess and govern land (pp. 13,

40).

9 The similarity between this reasoning and that used to create the federal government's
trust relationship for modern American Indian tribes is apparent. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the Supreme Court stated that "the character and religion of [the
native] inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior
genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy." Id. at 573. The Indians' normative divergence
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As the Spanish and Portuguese spread Western European influence
outside the Mediterranean region, they carried with them the Catholic
conceptualization of the rights of non-Christian peoples. For example,
upon first contact with Indians, and prior to commencing violence,
the Spanish conquistadors were to read aloud the Requerimiento'° to
apprise the natives of their natural law obligation to acknowledge the
superiority of Christian norms (pp. 91-92). If this formalistic entreaty
proved unpersuasive, and the Indians failed to comply with the wishes
of their conqueror-discoverers, the Pope's agents were then free to kill
or enslave them (pp. 91-92). The actual manner in which the announcement of the Requerimiento was executed, however, indicates
"a frightening gap between law on the books in the Old World and
law in action in the New World" (p. 92). As described by one historian:
"[T]he Requirement was read to trees and empty huts when no Indians
were to be found. Captains muttered its theological phrases into their
beards on the edge of sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league
away before starting the formal attack, and at times some leatherlunged Spanish notary hurled its sonorous phrases after the Indians
as they fled into the mountains. Once it was read in camp before the
soldiers to the beat of the drum. Ship captains would sometimes have
the document read from the deck as they approached an island, and
at night would send out enslaving expeditions . . ." (p. 92).11
According to Williams, the sixteenth century philosopher Franciscus de Victoria was responsible for Spain's major contribution to the
development of Western legal concepts affecting non-European infidels.1 2 Victoria desacralized the discourse of conquest. The measure
of a person's compliance with natural law was shifted from pronouncements of "a divinely installed papal mediary" to "humanized,
quickly led to the assertion that the tribes were "in a state of pupilage" and that "[tiheir relation
to the United States resembled that of a ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Fifty-four years later, the Court observed that the need for
trusteeship had only been heightened by past policies. "The power of the General Government
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary
to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell." United States
v. Kagama, I'8 U.S. 375, 384 (z885).
10 The Requerimiento was drafted at the request of King Ferdinand to justify formally
Spanish dominion in the New World (p. 91).
11 Williams quotes L. HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA 34 (1949).

12 The connection between the work of Victoria and modern federal Indian law was first
recognized nearly 5o years ago by Felix Cohen, the godfather of modern American Indian law.
See Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J.
1, 11-21 (1942). Cohen's opinion as to the ultimate result of Victoria's contributions, however,
was much different from Williams's. See, e.g., id. at ii ("[T]he legal ideals which Spanish
teachers proclaimed ... provided a humane and rational basis for an American law of Indian

affairs.").
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rationally conceived norms of conduct contained within the eclectic
but wholly privileged Western corpus of legal, political, and theological ideas that constituted the Christian natural-law tradition" (p. 103).
Moral norms of the Western European national community - the
Law of Nations - rather than papal decrees, became the measuring
rod of acceptable conduct. The result of a people's failure to conform,
however, remained the same: they were deemed "'unfit to found or
administer a lawful State up to the standard required by human and
civil claims,"' and the conquering Europeans were justified, indeed
obligated, to assume a benign guardianship over the land and laws
of the uncivilized until they matured sufficiently to comply with nat13
ural law on their own (p. J04).
While Spain was refining Western legal concepts to justify its
conquest of Native Americans, England began using similar legal
arguments to aid its own colonization efforts. English attempts to
conquer the "wild Irish," who were readily likened to savages of the
Indies (p. 141), eventually led to two novel variations on doctrines

borrowed from Spain.14 First, the English added underutilization of
land to the list of natural law violations deserving of forceful correction.' 5 Second, the English relied on private, rather than public,
funding of conquest. Thus, under the English plan, "investors would
finance the planting of colonies in exchange for royal recognition of
feudal rights in any Irish territory they conquered" (p. i39). These
innovations created a situation in which "the motive for conquest
(abundant land [available to private interests]) was subsumed into its
justification (the abundant land was underutilized)" (p. 140).
In justifying North American conquest, the English further refined
the legal basis for exploitation of natives by including rights of free
trade and travel as norms of the Law of Nations. According to noted
English theorist George Peckham and others, trade and traffic with
"infidels" or "savages" had been practiced for so long that Native
13 Williams quotes F. VICTORIA, DE INDIS DE IvRE BELLI REFLECTIONS I6o-6i (E. Nys
ed. J. Bate trans. 1917).
14 Williams struggles to make a direct connection between Victoria and English legal theorists. He concludes, ultimately, that Victoria's views were adopted surreptitiously by English
lawyers who, as members of the educated gentry, certainly would have been exposed to Victoria's
work, but who would have hesitated to cite a Spanish Dominican priest to the English Protestant
ruling class of the time (pp. 168-69).
IsThe view that colonization was justified by the natives' failure to develop properly their
lands was not "elevated to a principle of natural law in English colonial discourse" until after
the attempted Irish conquest (pp. 140-41). By the time England had shifted its colonizing
efforts to the New World, however, an English theorist could assert that "'God did create land,
to the end that it should by Culture and husbandry, yield things necessary for man's life'" (p.

171) (spelling modernized) (quoting D. QUtNN, THE VOYAGES AND COLONIZING ENTERPRISES
OF SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT 468 (1940)). The implication was that Native Americans, who

failed to conform with divine obligation by refusing to employ their lands in this manner, would
benefit from colonizing efforts.
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Americans' interference with trade and trade-related travel in the New
World violated "universally binding laws" (p. 167). Thus, economic
liberalism was added to the orthodoxy to which the Indians were
expected to comply.
The English economic justifications did not secure North America
against competing Spanish claims, however, because they failed to
justify England's claim to exclusive rights to Indian territory. As the
main focus of the discourse became the comparative rights of European conquerors, the Doctrine of Discovery began to assume its final
form. Spain based its claim to exclusive rights on the papal bulls of
1492 and 1493, in which Pope Alexander drew a line of demarcation
between the Spanish and Portuguese (pp. 79-8o) and, exercising his
guardianship responsibility, placed the inhabitants of most of North
and South America under the tutelage and direction of the Spanish
Crown. Protestant England, of course, refused to recognize this papal
action and looked to its own legal concepts to support its claim against
the Spanish.
George Peckham claimed that English discovery of the New World
prior to Columbus vested undoubted title in the English Crown (p.
170). 16 Subsequent English colonization efforts were, therefore, based
not on an assertion of new rights, but on the restoration of prior ones
created by discovery (pp. 170-71). The Doctrine of Discovery became
increasingly useful to the English as other European countries began
seeking New World wealth. While recognizing an inherent right to
trade with Indians, the English emphasized that this was their exclu17
sive right, justified by first discovery.
The final challenge to England's right of exclusive control over
Indian affairs came from American colonists. In an effort to avoid
costly wars, England sought in the eighteenth century to prohibit the
colonists from expanding into territories not already wrested from
Indian control. The Crown defended its authority to impose such
restrictions by declaring that Christian Europeans had superior rights
to lands held by non-Christians and that, by virtue of discovery, the
Crown was heir to those rights, including the inchoate rights of conquest and ultimate title to infidel territories. While the Indians enjoyed a possessory interest in lands until the right of conquest was
16 Peckham recalled a legend of a twelfth century Welsh Prince, Madoc, who had sailed to
the New World in i17o and left some of his crew there. As evidence of the validity of the
legend, Peckham contended that Madoc gave Welsh names (for example, "Gwynethes") to
islands, animals, and fruits which "'yet to this day beareth the same'" (p. 170). He also relied
on reports that English seamen had seen bearded men in the New World and argued that
because Native Americans were not normally bearded, "bearded Welshmen had intermarried
with the smooth-faced Indians and spread their hairy-faced progeny throughout the New World
as signs of English title" (p. 170).
17Conveniently, the Indians lacked the right to free trade because they had demonstrated
their inability to exercise that right.
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fully exercised, they could not sell their rights to the colonists without
permission of the Crown.
Many colonists, including such luminaries as George Washington,
Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, recoiled at the idea that
an English king could deny their right to purchase lands from frontier
Indians. The colonists could not agree among themselves, however,
as to the exact defect in the Crown's claim. White land speculators
from "landless"'18 states directly repudiated the Discovery Doctrine,
and relied on the Indians' natural law right to sell lands they occupied
to whomever they pleased (pp. 279-8o). Those from "landed" states
could not decide whether to reject or embrace the Discovery Doctrine
because their own property rights depended upon it. Prior to the
American Revolution, when the main issue was whether the Crown
or the colonies would control westward expansion onto Indian land,
Jefferson and others from the landed states attacked the Discovery
Doctrine as the offshoot of illegitimately Norman-imposed feudalism
(pp. 268-7I). Because the landed states' charters also derived from
that system (p. 272), their abhorrence of the Discovery Doctrine apparently abated once the successful revolution eliminated the Crown's
authority.
The Revolutionary War did not, however, end the debate over the
nature of the right to purchase Indian lands. It merely eliminated the
English Crown as a participant. The attack on the Discovery Doctrine
reached its peak during the Articles of Confederation period. Some
critics, such as Samuel Wharton, even asserted that natural law rights
of Native Americans were equal to those of their European counterparts. Indians held rights to their territory "'according to the laws of
nature and of nations' as 'the original and first occupants and possessors of the country"' (p. 303).19 According to such critics, European
claims to the contrary were based on the Norman-derived feudal
concepts rejected by the American Revolution. Not surprisingly, these
arguments were generally advanced by land speculators who would
personally benefit most from a doctrine allowing free alienation of
Indian lands (pp. 272-73).
Ultimately, however, the land speculators' arguments failed, and
the Discovery Doctrine prevailed when the landed states ceded their
rights inherited from the Crown to the United States as part of a
political compromise. 20 By discovery, the English had obtained the

IsSome states, such as Virginia, had charter claims to lands extending beyond the Appalachian Mountains. The charters of others, such as Maryland and New Jersey, limited their
boundaries to eastern lands. Those without charter claims to Western lands were "landless"
states. See M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SocIAL-CoNsTITuTIoNAL HISTORY OF THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at I5O (1940).
19 Williams quotes S. WHARTON, PLAIN FACTs 10-I1 (1781).

20 Congress agreed to accept Virginia's cession of its claims north of the Ohio and, in
exchange, to refrain from investigating conflicting claims in the region (p. 305).
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right and obligation to reform the Indians, as well as title to tribal
lands. The United States inherited those rights (by grant from the
colonies or otherwise), and when the Constitution was adopted,2 t control over Indian affairs vested exclusively in the United States.
Judicial ratification of the Discovery Doctrine came in 1823. In
Johnson v. M'Intosh,2 2 successors in interest to a speculator's claims
to Indian land argued that their claims were superior to those of
persons who purchased the same lands from the federal government
after a treaty between the United States and native tribes. In rejecting
that argument, the Supreme Court formally adopted the Doctrine of
Discovery, holding that the Indians could not have passed title to
property because they had lost that right when the English discovered
the territory. Like earlier European theorists, Chief Justice Marshall
described the practices of Western European governments as universal
norms, applicable to all the world, including Indians. 23 Further, as
partial explanation for ignoring the adverse impact this "universal"
rule would have upon the Indians, Marshall relied on the justification
originally advanced by conquerors in the Middle Ages - the normative divergence of the people: "Although we do not mean to engage
in the defense of those principles which Europeans have applied to
Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification,
in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been
wrested from them."'24 Thus, as Williams explains, "the legacy of
i,ooo years of European racism and colonialism directed against nonWestern peoples" and "[w]hite society's exercise of power over Indian
tribes received the sanction of the Rule of Law" (p. 317). The stage
was set for the destruction of Indian tribes.
Williams makes little effort to chronicle the post-Johnson treatment
of Indians under the Discovery Doctrine and its corollaries. 25 An
independent review of Indian law cases and statutes, however, reveals
that these legal doctrines have repeatedly been used to undermine
tribal authority and existence. 2 6 For example, only eight years after
21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes ..
22 21 U.S (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
23 Marshall went to considerable length to establish that the Discovery Doctrine was "the
common principle adopted by all Europe," id. at 575, thereby enjoying "universal recognition,"
id. at 574.
24 Id. at 589.
2S In a single scathing sentence, Williams sets forth his view of that history:

Violent suppression of Indian religious practices and traditional forms of government,
separation of Indian children from their homes, wholesale spoilation of treaty-guaranteed
resources, forced assimilative programs, and involuntary sterilization of Indian women
represent but a few of the practical extensions of a racist discourse of conquest that at
its core regards tribal peoples as normatively deficient and culturally, politically, and
morally inferior.
(pp. 325-26). But see Laurence, Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 425-26 (questioning the
accuracy of these claims).
26 The Supreme Court has explained the basis of the federal common law limits on tribal
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Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Indian tribes were not
independent foreign states entitled to invoke the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. 2 7 Using concepts derived from the Discovery
Doctrine, Marshall concluded that they could be considered no more
than "domestic dependent nations." 28 The Supreme Court has ruled
that as a necessary result of their status as "domestic dependent nations," Indian tribes have been deprived of power to alienate their
land freely without approval of the federal government, 2 9 enter into
direct diplomatic or commercial relations with foreign nations, 3 0 and
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians or non-tribal member
Indians who commit crimes on reservation lands. 3 1 The Court also
has held that the tribes lack power to regulate hunting and fishing
activities of non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within a reservation, 3 2 zone some kinds of fee-owned reservation land, 33 interfere
with state regulation of liquor sales on a reservation, 34 and, to some
lesser extent, exercise jurisdiction over civil cases involving non-Indians on a reservation.3 5 Such limitations severely curtail tribes' abilities to develop their own norms and shape their own communities. 36
authority by noting that tribes' "incorporation within the territory of the United States, and
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty
which they had previously exercised." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
Although the quoted language leaves the impression that these limitations were voluntarily
accepted by tribes in exchange for other benefits, history clearly demonstrates the contrary.
27 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
28 Id. at 17-18. Williams briefly discusses Cherokee Nation (p. 314).
29 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586-88 (1823).
30 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18. This assertion was dictum, but it has
never been questioned.
31 See Duro v. Reina, i1o S. Ct. 2053, 2059 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
32 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (i98I). Under the Doctrine of
Discovery, most reservation lands were originally held in trust for the tribes by the United
States. As a result of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. II9, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.), however, many reservations were eventually sold
in fee to individual Indians and non-Indians. The Court in Montana upheld the Crow tribe's
right to regulate fishing and hunting by non-Indians on tribal and trust land, see 450 U.S. at
557, but invalidated the application of similar regulations to land owned in fee by non-Indians.
33 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 1O9 S. Ct. 2994
(1989). The Brendale Court upheld the tribe's right to zone fee-owned land in a largely
undeveloped portion of the reservation to which the public had been granted only limited access,
but rejected the tribe's efforts to zone a more developed area to which the general public had
unrestricted access. See id. at 3009, 3015.
34 See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983).
35 See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 472 U.S. 845 (1985). The National
Farmers Court held that a challenge to the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction in a civil action
raised a federal issue sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, see id. at 852. It did
not, however, specify the parameters of the federal law.
36 For instance, inability to zone all lands in a reservation prevents the tribe from using one
of the most powerful governmental tools for defining a community's "essential character." Bren-
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Tribes' abilities to implement their distinctive norms have been
further limited by congressional action. Since Johnson, Congress has
enacted statutes opening reservations to non-Indian settlement,3 7 subjecting some tribes to certain state regulation, 38 requiring tribes to
adhere to standards similar to those imposed on federal and state
governments by the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment,3 9
and in some cases, completely terminating tribes. 40 Such actions obviously restrict, if not eliminate, a tribe's power to implement and
perpetuate its own norms. While such legislation is not necessarily
the direct product of the Discovery Doctrine, both ultimately derive
from the same Western legal concepts which recognize supreme and
41
plenary legislative authority in the discovering conqueror.

dale, o9 S. Ct. at 3009. In non-Indian contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the connection between zoning authority and the perpetuation of values. See, e.g., Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (declaring that local governments have the power
to "lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people").
37 Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 1i9, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.), 16o-acre parcels of reservation land were allotted to individual
tribal members with the intent of making surplus lands available to non-Indians. As a result
of the Act and subsequent implementing legislation, total Indian landholdings fell from x38
million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934. See C. WILKINSON, AMERCAN INDIANS,
TIME AND THE LAW 20 (1987); infra p. 1388.
38 See 18 U.S.C. § i162 (1988) (transferring criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands from the
federal to the state governments in California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake Reservation),
Nebraska, Oregon (except for the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except for the
Menominee Reservation, from which federal jurisdiction was removed and later reinstated, see
25 U.S.C. §9 891-9o3f (1988))); 28 U.S.C. § 136o (r988) (transferring civil jurisdiction from
federal to the state governments in the above-mentioned jurisdictions); see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 1321-1322 (x988) (providing mechanism whereby other states may assume jurisdiction over
Indian tribes subject to tribal consent).
39 The Indian Civil Rights Act statutorily imposes many, but not all, of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights on Indian tribes. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
40 "Termination" of a tribe involves "termination of federal trusteeship over the tribe, mandatory distribution of tribal assets to individual tribal members, and in some cases, disbandment
of the tribe." Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 1025 (ig8i); accord Wilkinson
& Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 139, 152-53 (1977).
During the "Termination Era" of the 195os, io9 tribes and bands were terminated. See id. at
151. Tribal status was eventually restored to some of the terminated tribes. See, e.g., Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. 99 903-903f (1988).
41 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the plenary nature of congressional power
to legislate with respect to Indian tribes. See, e.g., Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 788 n.30 (1984) (noting that "all aspects of Indian
sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 56 (1978) (observing that "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess"). The exact source of that
power has not been definitively established. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (i973) (holding that "the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making"); Newton, Federal
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Accordingly, although Williams himself does not draw the line
from Johnson to the present, it is not difficult to construct an argument
that the pre-revolutionary tendency to use Western legal thought to
excuse the conquest and elimination of normatively divergent peoples
continues today. 42 Perhaps Western legal thought cannot be used in
any other manner or trusted to defend traditional tribal ways. Without discussing post-Johnson law, Williams apparently leaps to this
radical conclusion. He insists that tribes be given the power to "seek
protection and preservation through means other than those provided
by a conqueror's rule of law and its discourse of conquest" (p. 327).
By advocating both the complete rejection of the Doctrine of Discovery (p. 326) and the granting of an equal voice to the tribes in the
international arena, Williams seems to repudiate traditional Western
legal concepts that recognize any federal authority over Indian
43
tribes.
If complete independence offers the only hope for tribal preservation, as Williams implies, prospects for Native Americans are dim
indeed. This absolutist position ignores the compelling role that settled expectations play in any non-anarchic society and the importance
of ensuring some degree of certainty in whatever system a society
adopts. That, in fact, was one of the main points of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Johnson. Marshall did not base his decision

Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, r99 (1984)
(arguing that "[tihe Plenary Power Doctrine . . . can be traced not only to [the constitutional]
commerce power but also to the treaty, war, and other foreign affairs powers, as well as the
property power"). Because the tribes never consented to the Constitution, however, even these
sources must ultimately rest on the concept that as a result of European discovery, tribal "rights
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished." Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); see also Laurence, Plenary Power, supra note 6,
at 421 (arguing that "the Discovery Rule ... influenced the later creature of the plenary power");
Williams, Eurocentric Myopia, supra note 6, at 452 (contending that "the Discovery Doctrine
as . . . articulated in Johnson is, after all, the conceptual foundation of the plenary power of
Congress in Indian affairs"). Conquest, not consent, is the ultimate foundation of the relationship.
42 See cases cited supra notes 31-35.
43 As an example of the kind of equal voice that should be given to American Indians,
Williams cites the Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and
Peoples of the Western Hemisphere that was adopted by the United Nations Non-Governmental
Organizations at the Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas (p. 331 n.14). Williams describes the document as calling for the "recognition of indigenous
nations as nations and proper subjects of international law, provided that the people concerned
desire such recognition and meet fundamental requirements of nationhood, including a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government with the ability to enter into relations
with other states" (p. 331 n.i4).

Williams has earlier observed that the Doctrine of Discovery had been used to eliminate the
tribes' ability to "engage in multilateral relations with other sovereign powers, an important
aspect of tribal political sovereignty." Williams, Origins of Indian Status, supra note 4, at 3
n.5. Restoration of that right seems to require independent nation status.
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solely on the moral or logical persuasiveness of the Doctrine of Discovery, 44 for such arguments, by themselves, were insufficient even
for the Western conquerors. Instead, Marshall noted the practical
realities of the situation:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
45
cannot be questioned.
The force of that argument has increased considerably since 1823,
as American society has made even further adjustments in reliance on
the existing system. Indian tribes no longer live in isolated expanses
of the realm. 4 6 The creation of hundreds of national enclaves interspersed throughout the United States (some within the confines of
major cities) would immeasurably alter existing notions of sovereignty.
Suggestions of such magnitude are so politically untenable that they
may be dismissed without serious consideration. 4 7 Accordingly, although Williams's book advances a compelling argument for alteration
of the status quo, advocacy of more incremental, attainable changes
is much more likely to benefit the tribes.
Pragmatic examination of the uses to which the legal reasoning in
Johnson and its progeny have been put suggests that Western legal
thought need not be completely jettisoned. Its concepts can be employed in ways that advance, rather than hinder, tribal interests. For
example, in Williams v. Lee, 48 the Supreme Court relied on the federal
supremacy over Indian affairs recognized in Johnson to reaffirm the
tribes' right to "make their own laws and be ruled by them" free from
state interference. 49 The same reasoning has been used to prevent a
state from taxing some transactions and activities involving tribes and
their lands. 5 0 Similarly, the tribal prohibition against alienation of
44 See supra p. 1379.
45 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 59, (1823).
46 "All Indian reservations are within state boundaries and some reservations are close to,
or even within, population centers. Indian reservations are located, for example, near Santa
Fe, Tucson, Pendleton, Oregon, Seattle, and Miami. They are located within Reno, Palm
Springs, and Tacoma." C. WILKINSON, supra note 37, at 25.
47 Williams's failure to acknowledge the "actual state of things" has elsewhere been criticized.
See Laurence, Actual State of Things, supra note 6, at 459-63; Laurence, Plenary Power, supra
note 6, at 435-37. For Williams's response, see Williams, Eurocentric Myopia, supra note 6.
48 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
49 Id. at 22o. Although the Court did not cite Johnson, it relied extensively on Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which in turn was based on principles articulated in
Johnson. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543-44.
SOSee New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983) (prohibiting the
state from enforcing hunting license fees and regulations on reservation lands); Central Mach.
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land without federal government approval, a direct result of Johnson,
has been successfully invoked to create a federal common law right
in the tribes to enforce their aboriginal and occupational property
rights nearly two centuries after they were deprived of particular
lands. 5 1 Even the demeaning legal theory that views Indians as wards
of the federal government needing guardianship protection has been
52
used to benefit Native Americans.
Consequently, the rationale of Johnson and its progeny has not
been purely inimical to tribal interests. Given the less than honorable
history of the federal government's relationship with Indian tribes,
however, it would be disingenuous to argue that tribal interests have
been well served by Western legal concepts. The examples cited above
are relatively isolated pieces of the modern federal Indian law mosaic.
Moreover, each of these Indian "victories" was subject to congressional
veto because of the plenary power theory. 53 Indeed, so long as Congress retains unlimited authority over tribes, their ability to create and
implement their own value systems will remain subject to the often
hostile will of the conquering majority.
If, however, constitutional arguments could be forged in defense
of tribal autonomy, the sword of Western jurisprudence could be recast
into a shield to safeguard Indian diversity from congressional and
judicial assaults. Principles announced in an early Indian law case
unfavorable to the tribes provide the basic materials for such a transformation, while doctrines announced in a recent non-Indian law
Supreme Court decision provide the necessary reshaping tools.
II. ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS:
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT AS A SHIELD
While some measure of constitutional protection has been extended to Native Americans in the past, such efforts have generally
focused solely on the rights of individual Indians, 5 4 not the tribal
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. i6o, 166 (ig8o) (holding that sales of farm
equipment to a tribe are exempt from a state's gross proceeds tax).
51 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234-36 (i985).
52 See Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1922).
53 For example, in Williams, the Court noted that if tribal authority to resolve contract
disputes "is to be taken away from [the tribe], it is for Congress to do it." 358 U.S. 217, 223
(1959). Similarly, the Oneida Court observed that the tribes' common law right to enforce their
property rights existed "'absent federal statutory guidance . . . .'" 470 U.S. at 236 (quoting
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 674 (974)). The Court also invited
Congress to act. See id. at 253 ("We agree that this litigation makes abundantly clear the
necessity for congressional action.").
54 See, e.g., Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Solem, 691 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1982)
(upholding free exercise and equal protection claims when prison officials allegedly prohibited
family members from attending religious ceremonies with Indian inmates when the same priv-
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group. 55 This omission has been particularly ironic because Indians
historically have been treated as distinct, divergent groups - as "domestic dependent nations." 56 Until now, this divergent group status
57
of Indians has been invoked as a reason for limiting tribal authority.
That same concept, however, when coupled with recent non-Indian
law cases concerning the constitutional right of association, could be
used for the benefit of the tribe.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,58 a case involving Minnesota's
efforts to force local chapters of the Jaycees to accept women as
members, the Court outlined the framework of the constitutional right
of association. 5 9 According to Roberts and its progeny, 60 the Constitution limits the government's authority to regulate two distinct classes

ilege was granted to inmates of other faiths); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir.
1975) (striking down on free exercise grounds prison rule that required an Indian inmate to cut
his hair); Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 2984) (granting preliminary
injunction to prevent prison officials from violating Indian inmates' free exercise right to wear
religious headbands). This protection has been far from absolute, however. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, iio S. Ct. 1595, 16o6 (iggo) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to state's
denial of unemployment benefits to an Indian fired because of ceremonial ingestion of peyote);
Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 81o, 813 (8th Cir. 199o) (questioning the continuing validity of
Teterud).
55 As Williams has explained, concepts such as "'due process.., equal protection.., the
freedom of religion' are usually individual-contextuaized rights in United States constitutional
adjudicative theory .

.

. ."

Williams, Eurocentric Myopia, supra note 6, at 447 (quoting

Laurence, Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 419). "When Indian tribal people talk about
important 'rights'.... Their focus is on protection and perpetuation of their people's triballyoriented existence. This critical 'right' ... to a tribal existence, has never been protected by
the white man's law or courts." Id. The same observation has been made with respect to the
Western legal system's treatment of non-Indian groups. See Garet, Communality and Existence:
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1012, 1025, 1049 (2983).

S6 In Cherokee Nation, the case in which the term "domestic dependent nation" first appeared,
Chief Justice Marshall demonstrated how Indians were treated as a "group" rather than as
individuals:
[The Cherokees] have been uniformly treated as a State from the settlement of our
country The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as
a people . . . responsible in their political character .

. .

for any aggression committed

on the citizens of the United States by any individual in their community.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 6 (1831) (emphasis added).
S7 See supra pp. 1379-80 (discussing limitations imposed on tribes as a result of their status
as domestic dependent nations).
58 468 U.S. 6og (1984).
59 See id. at 622-23. The Court ultimately upheld the Minnesota law, which prevented the
Jaycees from discriminating on the basis of gender, against the organization's claim of associational freedom. See id. at 628-29. In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not hold that the
members of the organization had no right to protection from outside interference. Rather, it
held that abridgement of the right was subject to strict scrutiny, a test that was satisfied by the
statute in question. See id.
60 Three years after Roberts, the Court again addressed the associational right, upholding a
California statute requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women. See Board of Directors
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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of association: "intimate" and "expressive." 61 Under the criteria set

forth by the Court, many tribes might not merit protection as intimate
associations,6 2 but the protection afforded expressive associations
would seem to be more readily applicable.
Expressive associations facilitate the exercise of other constitutionally protected activities, such as "speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion." 63 The right of
expressive association seems particularly well suited for use by tribes,
as its primary purposes are to preserve "political and cultural diversity" and to protect "dissident expression from suppression by the
majority." 64 In short, it is designed to ensure that divergent voices,
such as those of Native Americans, are not silenced.
Expressive associational rights have been extended to a "wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends." 65 The expressions in which groups must engage, therefore, need not be limited to communications with those outside the
group - the Constitution also defends the inculcation of traditional
values within a group. 6 6 An association, therefore, is entitled to
constitutional protection if a "'not insubstantial part"' of its activities
67
facilitate either internal or external expression.
61 See Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 544; Roberts 468 U.S. at 617-18.

62 Although the Court has "not held that constitutional protection [for intimate association]
is restricted to relationships among family members," it has limited it to those relationships that
"presuppose 'deep attachments and commitment to the necessarilyfew other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life.'" Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberts, 468
U.S. at 619-2o) (emphasis added).
Thus, among the key factors in determining whether a relationship falls within the intimate
associational protection is the size of the group. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 62o. Many tribes
have several thousand enrolled members. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS,
AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 35 (zg8o)
(listing sixty reservations containing more than iooo Indian residents).
That size is a critical factor may itself reflect a Western bias against non-Western cultures.
An Indian's relationship to his or her tribe may be intimate from a cultural viewpoint, notwithstanding the large size of the tribe. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY, at vii-viii (198o).
63 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; accord Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 544.
64 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
65 Id.; see also Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,
700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988) (finding that the KKK is entitled to expressive association
protection).
66 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[P]rotected expression may also
take the form of. . . inculcation of traditional values [and] instruction of the young. .. ").
A group's ability to communicate internally affects its power to convey its distinct messages to
those outside the group. See Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Religious Group
Rights, i989 WIS. L. REv. 99, 111.
67 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 156o, 1570
(8th Cir. 1983)). The Roberts Court held that the Jaycees were "plainly" covered by the associational protection, id. at 622, because the organization had taken public positions on a number
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This protection could easily be extended to Indian tribes, which
often engage in expressive conduct. A major function of modern tribes
is to advance their members' unique political, economic, cultural and
social interests, either by communicating with those outside the group
through activities such as lobbying, 68 or by inculcating tribal values
69
in members through ceremonies and enforcement of tribal law.
Tribal use of this right of expressive association would shield tribes
from the kinds of congressional abuses which Native Americans have
suffered in the past and which may occur in the future. Government
action unconstitutionally interferes with the freedom of expressive
association in a number of ways. Most relevant to tribes are acts that
affect the "philosophical cast" of the group and thereby "change the
message communicated by the group's speech," 70 and those that "interfere with the internal organization or affairs of the group." 7 1 A
review of Congress's legislative record with respect to Indian tribes
reveals a number of instances of both kinds of impermissible governmental interference.
The most egregious example of an unconstitutional intrusion affecting the philosophical cast of the tribe occurred in the 195os when
Congress "terminated" a number of tribes. 72 Termination effectively
eliminated the revenues, territorial base, and governmental authority
crucial to any tribe's legal existence. 73 Such actions dramatically altered the philosophical cast of the "terminated" tribes, thereby preventing them from fully expressing their distinct cultural messages to
both their members and outsiders. For a tribe to communicate its
distinct message adequately, a formal tribal organization must exist
one possessing a land base and some governmental authority.
of issues and had "engage[d] in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other
activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment," id. at 626-27.
68 Because their continued existence depends so much on Congress's goodwill, "[h]ighly
effective legislative campaigns have been pursued by individual tribes and by national organizations." C. WILKINSON, supra note 37, at 82. For specific examples of successful lobbying
efforts by Indian tribes, see id. at 192 n.i51; F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
196-2oo (1982).
69
See V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FuTuRE OF
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 248 (1984); D. McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN
SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS 85 (i973).

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 623.
72 See supra note 40.
73 Although termination legislation did not expressly eliminate tribal governmental authority,
deprivation of a territorial base and federal funding, together with the express authorization for
the exercise of state regulatory authority, "effectively stripped" the tribes "of their broad powers
to act as governments." Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 40, at i54; see also 0. REYNOLDS,
HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw § 66, at 197 (1982) (stating that "territory over which
the government has some control" and "money with which to pay the costs of activities" are
two essential elements of effective governmental action); Clinton, supra note 40, at 1042 (arguing
that "ownership of a land base and the exercise of government power are integrally intertwined").
70
71
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The importance of a tribal land base to the continued existence of
tribal culture has been evidenced in many ways over the past two
74
centuries. When, as a result of the General Allotment Act of I887,
Congress opened Indian reservations to non-Indian settlement and
thereby reduced the size of the tribal land base by nearly sixty-five
percent, the impact was "less economic than psychological and even
spiritual. A way of life had been smashed; a value system destroyed."7 5 The world views of many Indians were altered, 76 and the
character of both the individual Indians and their tribes was radically
changed. 7 7 Indeed, for some, the destruction of Indian tribal culture
was the purpose of the Allotment Act.78
Tribes, of course, recognized the link between a land base over
which they had primary control and the preservation of their culture
even before the 1887 Allotment Act. Indeed, many tribes agreed to
leave their ancestral lands only when assured that they would be
given primary control over some land base. As one Quapaw chief
explained in 1833, "'We want to continue ... any where, even in the

swamps where the whites will never settle. If our Great Father [the
United States President] will grant our request, he may keep our
money, we will give it all to him.

'79

Modern courts also have recognized the importance of a tribal land
base in perpetuating tribal culture. In upholding the Salish and Kootenai tribes' residency requirement for tribal council candidates, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "the cultural identity of the . . .
Tribes is primarily a product of continued physical presence on the
reservation" and that "the elected leaders of the Tribe must be current
and long-term actual residents . . . in order to insure that they are

sufficiently familiar with and part of that culture in order to be
74

Ch. i9,

75 W.

24

Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C).

WASHBURN,

RED MAN'S LANDJWHITE MAN'S LAW: A

STUDY OF THE PAST AND

PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 75 (1971).
76 As Washburn explains:

No longer did many tribal Indians feel pride in the tribal possession of hundreds of
square miles of territory which they could use as a member of the tribe. Now they were
forced to limit their life and their vision to an incomprehensible individual plot of 16o
or so acres in a checkerboard of neighbors, hostile and friendly, rich and poor, white and
red.
Id.
77 "The admired order and the sense of community often observed in early Indian communities were replaced by the easily caricatured features of rootless, shiftless, drunken outcasts, so
familiar to the reader of early twentieth-century newspapers." Id. at 76.
78 As Theodore Roosevelt said, "The General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine
to break up the tribal mass. It acts directly upon the family and the individual." S. TYLER,
A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 104 (1973) (quoting 15 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1914, at 6672 (J. Richardson ed. I896-I917) [hereinafter
MESSAGES AND PAPERSD.

79C. WILKINSON, supra note 37, at 18 (quoting the Speech of Head Chief of Quapaw Tribe
in Council Meeting Connected with the Negotiation of a Treaty (May 1o, 1833)).
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entrusted to carry it forward."8 0 Deprivation of a land base in which
a full Indian community develops clearly alters the tribe's philosoph-

ical cast and modifies the message it can and will communicate.
Limiting tribal governmental authority over the community in
which tribal members reside also adversely affects tribal culture.
Many types of governmental activities facilitate or obstruct the perpetuation of a particular way of life. The Navajo tribe's zoning
authority to prohibit the construction of any structures other than

traditional hogans in a specific part of the reservation, for example,
can advance significantly the tribe's ability to teach traditional Navajo
values and customs to its members. 8 1 If the zoning decision were
made by non-Indian state and county officials, who might view the
hogans merely as unsightly mud huts, the atmosphere on the reservation could change drastically in a way that, over time, would
substantially alter the values of tribal members and the resultant
messages conveyed by the tribe both internally and externally. Likewise, non-Indian control of other governmental decisions affecting
tribal members, such as the development of educational policy 82 or
criminal law, 8 3 alters not only the content of those decisions, but also
the entire character of the regulated tribal group.

8o Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 243 (9th Cir. 1976).

81 The central place and meaning of the hogan in the life of the traditional Navajo is likely
to elude most non-Indians:
To [Navahos], their hogans are not just places to eat and sleep, mere parts of the
workaday world, as homes have tended to become in the minds of white people, particularly in cities. The hogan occupies a central place in the sacred world also. The first
hogans were built by the Holy People .... Navaho myths prescribe the position of
persons and objects within; they say why the door must always face the rising sun and
why the dreaded bodies of the dead must be removed through a hole broken in the hogan
wall to the north (always the direction of evil). A new hogan is often consecrated with
a Blessing Way Rite or songs from it ....
C. KzucKHoHN & D. LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 89-90 (rev. ed. 1974).
82 The impact of educational policy on the outlook of American Indians has been recognized
for centuries, especially by those who desired to reshape the Indian view to conform to traditional
Western norms. Daniel Rosenfelt has noted that in the effort to "civilize" Indians, "[elducation
was perhaps the most important instrument ... as evidenced by the inclusion of education
provisions in Indian treaties beginning in 1794 and continuing through the end of the treatymaking in i889." Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REv. 489,
492 (i973). The most "successful" of these devices was the boarding school. As described by
anthropologist Peter Farb:
The children usually were kept at boarding school for eight years, during which time
they were not permitted to see their parents, relatives, or friends. Anything Indian dress, language, religious practices, even outlook on life . . .was uncompromisingly
prohibited. Ostensibly educated, articulate in the English language, wearing store-bought
clothes, and with their hair short and their emotionalism toned down, the boardingschool graduates were sent out either to make their way in a White world that did not
want them, or to return to a reservation to which they were now foreign.
P. FARB,MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA FROM
PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 257-59 (1968).

83A tribe's power to criminalize certain conduct may perpetuate and communicate unique
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In short, federal termination of a tribe's legal existence profoundly
impacts the philosophical cast of the tribe and alters the message
likely to be communicated by the tribe in several critical ways. Such
congressional action therefore infringes on the tribe's constitutional
right of expressive association. Even less severe intrusions, which
impact only limited areas of tribal life, may likewise be constitutionally
suspect.
Of course, not every statute that changes the philosophical cast or
alters the message of a group violates the Constitution. A court must
consider the governmental purpose behind the statute. Nevertheless,
infringements on this associational right are permissible only if the
legislation advances a "compelling state interest[], unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." 84 Under this test,
termination legislation, which was designed solely to make the members of the affected tribe more "white" by suppressing the proliferation
of Indian ideals,8 5 is clearly unconstitutional. Other assimilationist
legislation, such as the Allotment Act, which sought to force Indians
to "change their mode of life" to conform to the white world's "idea
of home, of family, and of property,"8 6 likewise would be invalid.

tribal values and culture. Allowing non-Indians, who do not share those values, to define crimes
will likely alter not only the substance of the criminal law, but also the values communicated
to those governed by the law. For example, in Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz.
1969), a non-Indian attorney was excluded from the reservation for laughing derisively during
a tribal council meeting. A federal judge revoked the tribal order, finding that "[i]nvocation of
the drastic power of exclusion for this reason is wholly unreasonable," id. at 32, without
considering that "[flor a white man who had previously placed himself in defiance of tribal
government to enter into the seat of government . . . and to laugh scornfully in the face of
tribal government, may, within the culture of the Navajo tribe, constitute a grave transgression."
Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Errorin Construction of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. REv. 1, 50-51 (975).
84 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 623 (1984) (emphasis added); see also
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (applying this
standard).
8s The Termination legislation was spurred in large part by a 1948 study commission headed

by Herbert Hoover, which announced that Indian "assimilation must be the dominant goal of
public policy," S. TYLER, supra note 78, at 166, with the hope that when termination was
completed "'[tihe Indians will have been integrated, economically and politically, as well as
culturally.'" A. GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN 549 (ig8o) (quoting THE HOOVER COMMISSION

REPORT 473 (1949)). As one Montana Supreme Court justice observed: "The policy was to have
declared an Indian no longer an Indian." Speech by R.V. Bottomly to National Congress of
American Indians (1956), reprinted in S. TYLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A STUDY OF CHANGES IN
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TowARD INDANS 138-39 (1964).
86 1, CONG. REC. 9o5-o6 (18gi) (remarks of Sen. Pendieton). As one commentator has

noted, "it would never have occurred to any of the debaters to inquire of the Indians what ideas
they had of home, of family, and of property. It would have been assumed, in any case, that
the ideas, whatever they were[,] were without merit since they were Indian." S. TYLER, supra
note 78, at 104 (quoting McNickle, Indians and Europeans: Indian-White Relations from
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While some federal limitations on tribal governmental authority would
withstand constitutional scrutiny notwithstanding their impact on the
philosophical cast of the tribe,8 7 those that have as their primary goal
the elimination of tribal customs merely because they differ from
majority customs likely would not withstand strict scrutiny. Much
federal legislation would fail this constitutional test, because federal
Indian policy has often destroyed tribal existence solely to encourage
88
Indians to assimilate into the larger society.
Congress also has wielded its plenary power over Indians to enact
legislation interfering with the internal organization and composition
of the tribal group. The Indian Civil Rights Act8 9 has been interpreted to require tribes to alter the method of choosing tribal leaders, 90
to change the qualifications for election to tribal office, 9 1 and in one
92
instance to admit members contrary to tribal wishes.
Requiring tribes to make these kinds of changes might, in certain
93
situations, be justified by some independent governmental interest.
Extending the constitutional associational protection to tribes, however, would shift the burden to Congress to show that there is a
compelling governmental interest that could not be achieved through
Discovery to 1887, in AMERICAN INDANsSAND AMERICAN LIFE (G. Simpson & J. Yinger eds.
1957)).
87 For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act prohibits a tribe from imposing the death
sentence for violations of tribal law. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988) (limiting maximum tribally
imposed penalty to one year imprisonment and $5OOO fine). That restriction furthers the government's compelling interest in preserving the life of its citizens and likely could be imposed
on the tribes even if it interfered with the manner in which tribes traditionally dealt with certain
kinds of conduct.
88 For example, the General Allotment Act of 1887 offered U.S. citizenship - which was
not generally granted to all Indians until 1924, see F. COHEN, supra note 68, at 153 - to any
Indian willing to live away from the tribal group and adopt the habits of a "civilized life." Ch.
ii9, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). This provision
clearly represents a constitutionally suspect effort "to impose penalties or withhold benefits from
individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
89 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1312, 1321-1326, 1331, 1341 (1988).
90 See White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring tribe to
adhere to one person-one vote standard); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir.
1973) (same).
91 See Daly, 483 F.2d at 705-06 (affirming the lower court's elimination of a blood quantum
requirement for candidates for one tribal election).
92 See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1o39, 1047-48 (ioth Cir. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The Roberts Court observed that "[t]here can be no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire." 468 U.S. at 623.
93 For example, the ordinance at issue in Martinez excluded from tribal membership the
children of female members who were married to non-members, but not those of male members
married to non-members. See Martinez, 540 F.2d at 1040. In light of Roberts and Rotary
International, the government's need to eliminate gender-based discrimination might outweigh
the tribe's associational interest, particularly when, as in Martinez, the tribal requirement was
not clearly tied to tribal tradition. See id.
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means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. 94 Such
a showing is unnecessary under the plenary power theory. Moreover,
a more expansively understood associational right would prevent Congress from interfering with tribal organizations solely to eliminate

ideological, cultural, and attitudinal differences between the tribes and
the rest of American society. 95 Thus, the American legal system's
decision to treat Indians as divergent groups - a decision which in
the past has deprived them of rights due to their dependent nation
status - could now benefit Indians.
In light of the Western legal system's past performance, one might
doubt, as Williams does, 96 whether reliance on these types of arguments will effectively stem the assimilationist tide of Western government. The white man's jurisprudence was, after all, advanced on
97
behalf of Indians during revolutionary times without any success.
Centuries of use of Western jurisprudence as a sword against tolerance
and diversity may have rendered it too inflexible to be reshaped into
a shield. For the sake of the tribes, however, as well as the sake of
all other Americans, 98 we must hope that the metal is still malleable.
94 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; supra p. 139o; see also United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d
1135 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding an act requiring cattle producers and importers to finance a
national beef promotion campaign sustainable "only if the government can demonstrate that the
Act was adopted to serve compelling state interests, that are ideologically neutral, and that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of... associational freedoms")
(emphasis added).
9S Other Western legal concepts designed to protect group rights and diversity might then
also be reshaped to inhibit further destruction of tribal viewpoints and customs. For example,
some aspects of tribal sovereignty could be protected through creative use of the due process
clause and its equal protection component. See Newton, supra note 41, at 261-71, 281-88.
Also, if the aim or primary effect of the governmental action is the destruction of the Indian
family (rather than the larger tribe), this clearly runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right
of intimate association. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-i9. Thus, legislation such as the Allotment
Act which, according to its supporters, "'acts directly upon the family,'" S. TYLER, supra note
78, at 104 (quoting MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 78, at 6672 (speech of Theodore
Roosevelt)), is unconstitutional to the degree it is successful.
II8,

96 See supra p. 1382.

97 See supra pp. 1376, 1378. Current proponents of Indian rights differ, however, from
those of the late eighteenth century. While current proponents are driven by moral considerations, see F. COHEN, supra note 68, at v, their predecessors were land speculators motivated
by greed.
98
"Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our
political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith ....
"F. COHEN, supra note 68,
at v.

